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Abstract: 
Divergent thinking is central to the study of individual differences in creativity, but the  traditional scoring 
systems (assigning points for infrequent responses and summing the points) face well-known problems. After 
critically reviewing past scoring methods, this article describes a new approach to assessing divergent thinking 
and appraises its reliability and validity. In our new Top 2 scoring method, participants complete a divergent 
thinking task and then circle the two responses that they think are their most creative responses. Raters then 
evaluate the responses on a 5-point scale. Regarding reliability, a generalizability analysis showed that subjective 
ratings of unusual-uses tasks and instances tasks yield dependable scores with only 2 or 3 raters. Regarding validity, 
a latent-variable study (n = 226) predicted divergent thinking from the Big Five factors and their higher-order 
traits (Plasticity and Stability). Over half of the variance in divergent  thinking could be explained by 
dimensions of personality. The article presents instructions for measuring divergent thinking with the new 
method. Keywords: creativity, divergent thinking, generalizability theory, validity, reliability, assessment 
Article: 
The study of divergent thinking is one of the oldest and largest areas in the scientific  study of 
creativity (Guilford, 1950; Weisberg, 2006). Within the psychometric study of creativity—the study of 
individual differences in creative ability and potential—divergent thinking is the most promising candidate 
for the foundation of creative ability (Plucker &  Renzulli, 1999; Runco, 2007). For this reason, widely-used 
creativity tests, such as the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT), are largely divergent thinking tests 
(Kim, 2006). 
Nevertheless, modern writings on creativity reflect unease about the usefulness of  divergent thinking 
tasks. In their reviews of creativity research, both Sawyer (2006) and Weisberg (2006) criticize divergent thinking 
research for failing to live up to its promise: after half a  century of research, the evidence for global creative 
ability ought to be better (see Plucker, 2004, 2005; Baer & Kaufman, 2005). While reviewing the notion of 
creativity as an ability, Simonton (2003, p. 216) offers this blistering summary of creativity assessment: 
None of these suggested measures can be said to have passed all the psychometric hurdles required of 
established ability tests. For instance, scores on separate creativity tests often correlate too highly with 
general intelligence (that is, low divergent validity), correlate  very weakly among each other (that is, 
low convergent validity), and correlate very weakly with objective indicators of overt creative behaviors 
(that is, low predictive validity). 
We believe that researchers interested in divergent thinking ought to take these criticisms 
seriously. Although we don’t think that the literature is as grim as Simonton’s synopsis implies, 
divergent thinking research commonly finds weak internal consistency and rarely finds large 
effect sizes. 
Informed by the large body of research and criticism (Sawyer, 2006; Weisberg, 2006), researchers ought 
to revisit the assessment and scoring of divergent thinking. There are many  reasons for observing small 
effects—including genuinely small effect sizes—but low reliability seems like a good place to start. Methods of 
administering and scoring divergent thinking tasks have changed little since the 1960s (Torrance, 1967; Wallach & 
Kogan, 1965), despite some good refinements and alternatives since then (Harrington, 1975; Michael & Wright, 
1989). It would be surprising, given the advances in psychometrics and assessment over the last 40 years, if the 
old ways were still the best ways. 
In this article, we examine an alternative method of assessing and scoring divergent  thinking tasks. 
Our method is simply a combination of past ideas that deserve a new look, such  as the necessity of instructing 
people to be creative (Harrington, 1975) and the value of  subjective ratings of creativity (Amabile, 1982; 
Michael & Wright, 1989). The first part of this article reviews the assessment of divergent thinking and 
considers psychometric problems with these methods. We then appraise the reliability and validity of two new 
scoring methods: judges rate each response on a 5-point scale, and the ratings are averaged across all responses 
(Average scoring) or across only the two responses that people chose as their best responses (Top 2 scoring). In 
Study 1, we examined the reliability of these scoring systems by applying generalizability  theory (Cronbach, 
Gleser, Nanda, & Rajaratnam, 1972). In Study 2, we examine the validity of  the scoring systems with a latent 
variable analysis of personality and creativity. Finally, we review the implications of this work and provide 
take-home recommendations for researchers  interested in using the new methods. 
Divergent Thinking 5 
Assessing Divergent Thinking 
Divergent thinking is assessed with divergent thinking tasks, in which people generate  ideas in response 
to verbal or figural prompts (Kim, 2006; Michael & Wright, 1989; Wallach & Kogan, 1965). In a typical verbal 
task, people are asked to generate unusual uses for common  objects (e.g., bricks, knives, newspapers), instances 
of common concepts (e.g., instances of things are round, strong, or loud), consequences of hypothetical events 
(e.g., what would happen if  people went blind, shrank to 12 inches tall, or no longer needed to sleep), or 
similarities between common concepts (e.g., ways in which milk and meat are similar). Divergent thinking tasks 
are thus a kind of fluency task: they assess production ability in response to a constraint (Bousfield & Sedgewick, 
1944). But unlike letter fluency tasks (e.g., list as many words that start with M as you can) and semantic fluency 
tasks (e.g., list as many cities as you can), divergent thinking tasks  intend to capture the creative quality of the 
responses, not merely the number of responses. 
Uniqueness Scoring 
The most common way of scoring divergent thinking tasks is some form of uniqueness scoring. In their 
classic book, Wallach and Kogan (1965) criticized past efforts to assess and score creativity (e.g., Getzels & 
Jackson, 1962). As an alternative, they recommended pooling the  sample’s responses and assigning a 0 or 1 to 
each response. Any response given by only one person—a unique response—receives a 1; all other responses 
receive a 0. This scoring method  has several virtues. First, it can be done by a single rater. Second, it’s easier 
than methods suggested by Guilford, such as weighting each response by its frequency (e.g., Wilson, Guilford, 
& Christensen, 1953). Finally, it has a straightforward interpretation—a creative response is a unique response. 
The Wallach and Kogan uniqueness index is popular in modern creativity research, in part because of 
the popularity of the Wallach and Kogan tasks. Alternative scoring methods, however, share the same 
psychometric model. The Torrance Tests, for example, assign points for responses that fall outside a normative 
sample’s pool of common responses (Torrance, 2008), and the points are then summed for an originality 
score. Other researchers assign 1 point for responses given by fewer than 5% of the sample and 0 points for 
all other responses (e.g., Milgram & Milgram, 1976), and these points are summed. Despite their surface 
differences, the Wallach and Kogan uniqueness score and the Torrance originality score share the same 
psychometric model: people receive points for statistically uncommon responses, and these points are 
summed. 
Problems With Uniqueness Scoring 
Uniqueness scoring, in our view, has three fundamental limitations. Two have been known for 
several decades; a third we raise for the first time. 
1. Uniqueness Scoring Confounds Fluency and Creativity 
Critics of divergent thinking research point out that uniqueness scores (the number of unique 
responses) are confounded with fluency scores (the total number of responses). In Wallach and Kogan’s 
(1965) original study, for example, the confounding was severe: a recent reanalysis found a relationship of ß = .89 
between latent uniqueness and fluency factors (Silvia, in press). Torrance’s method of assigning points for 
not-common responses has the same problem. The latest TTCT verbal manual (Torrance, 2008) reports a 
median correlation of r = .88 between originality scores and fluency scores. This confounding is inevitable 
because the likelihood of generating a unique response increases as the number of responses increases. The 
confounding of uniqueness and fluency is a problem for two obvious reasons. First, the quality of responses 
and the quantity of responses ought to be distinct, according to theories of  creativity, so creativity 
assessment ought to yield distinct estimates of quality and quantity. Second, the level of confounding can be 
so severe that researchers cannot be certain that uniqueness scores explain any variance beyond mere fluency 
scores. 
Since the 1970s, researchers have discussed the fluency confound as a problem and have considered ways of 
handling it (Clark & Mirels, 1970; Dixon, 1979; Hocevar, 1979a, 1979b; Hocevar & Michael, 1979). Many 
variations of uniqueness scoring have been proposed, such as weighting each response by its frequency (Runco, 
Okuda, & Thurston, 1987), scoring only the first three responses (Clark & Mirels, 1970), or quantifying fluency 
as the number of non-unique responses (Moran, Milgram, Sawyers, & Fu, 1983). Although worthwhile attempts, 
these scoring methods have not always performed well psychometrically (Michael & Wright, 1989; Speedie, 
Asher, & Treffinger, 1971). Furthermore, variations on uniqueness scoring do not overcome the two other 
criticisms. 
2. Statistical Rarity is Ambiguous 
The interpretation of unique scores is not as clear as it initially seems. Creative responses are not merely 
unique: they must also be appropriate to the task at hand (Sawyer, 2006). Many unique responses are not 
creative, but they slip through the cracks of the objective scoring  system. First, bizarre, glib, and 
inappropriate responses are hard to filter from the pool of  responses. Any researcher who has implemented 
the 0/1 system knows that the line between ―creative‖ and ―random‖ is often fuzzy. Researchers will disagree, 
for example, over whether ―a round cube‖ or ―a roundhouse kick from Chuck Norris!‖ should be filtered as 
capricious, 
inappropriate responses to a ―things that are round‖ task. Second, mundane responses will slip through the 
cracks of the uniqueness scoring system, thereby reducing its reliability. For  example, ―make a brick path‖ 
is an obvious use for a brick, but it could be unique in the small samples typical of creativity research. 
In short, the objective 0/1 system is not as objective as it seems: it will tend to give 1s to weird responses 
and to common responses that raters would judge as uncreative. Some evidence for this claim comes from 
research that compared the objective 0/1 coding with subjective 0/1 coding. Hocevar (1979b) had 4 raters score 
responses using a 0/1 unoriginal/original scale. The raters’ uniqueness scores were substantially lower than 
the objective uniqueness scores,  indicating that the raters had a higher criterion for judging uniqueness. 
3. Uniqueness Scoring Penalizes Large Samples 
One of the biggest problems with uniqueness scoring—and one not recognized to  date—is that it 
imposes a penalty on researchers who collect large samples. For uniqueness  scoring, the creativity of a 
response depends on the pool of responses: a response is more likely to be scored as unique in a small sample than 
in a large sample. The probability that a response will appear in the pool is a function of the number of people, 
so as sample size increases, the  probability that two people will give the same response increases. For 
example, the response  ―door knob‖ as an instance of something round would be scored 0 in a large sample but 
could be unique in a small sample. As a result, the base rate of creativity goes down as the sample’s size goes up. 
Stated differently, the criterion that a response must pass to be a unique response is too low in a small sample 
and too high in a large sample. Creative responses are thus harder to  detect, in a signal-detection sense, in 
large samples. 
An extreme example demonstrates our point. With a sample size of 1, all of the lone participant’s 
responses are creative. With a sample size of 5, only the most grossly obvious  responses receive 0s, and most 
responses will receive 1s. With a sample size of 100,000 people, however, a response must be highly creative (or 
merely bizarre) to receive a 1. As a result, most people will have 0s for all of their responses. Creativity is harder 
to detect in a sample of 100,000 than in a sample of 100, because the criterion for creativity is excessively high 
(1 in 100,000 versus 1 in 100). And uniqueness scores needn’t reach an asymptotically low level: it’s  
theoretically possible (although unlikely) in vast samples for no response to receive a 1. There’s something perverse 
about a psychometric method that performs worse with large samples. Researchers shouldn’t be penalized for 
collecting large samples, particularly researchers  interested in the psychometric study of individual 
differences.1 
Subjective Scoring of Creativity as an Alternative 
What alternative scoring methods can overcome these three problems? We think that  creativity 
researchers ought to reconsider the value of subjective scoring of divergent thinking responses. There’s a long 
tradition of scoring creativity by having trained raters evaluate peoples’ responses. In the earliest modern 
creativity research, Guilford’s research team used raters to  score some of their divergent thinking tasks. To 
assess the cleverness component of creativity, Guilford had people generate plot titles, which were then scored 
on 1-5 scales by 2 raters (Christensen, Guilford, & Wilson, 1957) or on 0-6 scales by 3 raters (Wilson et al., 
1953). To assess the remoteness of association component of creativity, people generated responses to a 
consequences task; the responses were scored on a 1-3 ―remoteness‖ scale (Christensen et al.,  1957). Since 
Guilford, many researchers have used subjective ratings of responses to divergent thinking tasks, such as scoring 
each response on a 1-5 scale (Harrington, 1975) or a 1-7 scale (Grohman, Wodniecka, & K#usak, 2006), scoring 
responses as high or low in quality (Harrington, Block, & Block, 1983), and scoring the full set of responses on 
a 1-7 scale (Mouchiroud & Lubart, 2001). 
Subjective scoring of creativity—particularly Amabile’s (1982) consensual assessment technique—has 
been popular for several decades in the study of creative products. The  consensual assessment technique 
entails independent judges—ideally but not necessarily experts—rating products for creativity, based on the 
judges’ tacit, personal meanings of  creativity. Judges often show high consistency and agreement (Amabile, 
1982; Baer, Kaufman, & Gentile, 2004; Kaufman, Gentile, & Baer, 2005; Kaufman, Lee, Baer, & Lee, in press). 
Expertise enhances agreement, but recruiting experts is probably more important for studies of real  creative 
products than for studies of responses to divergent thinking tasks. The consensual  assessment technique has 
worked in a wide range of contexts and samples, indicating that the subjective scores have sufficient validity (see 
Amabile, 1996). 
Subjective ratings can overcome the three problems faced by uniqueness scoring. First, ratings should, 
in principle, be unconfounded with fluency: because the raters judge each  response separately, generating a 
lot of responses won’t necessarily increase one’s creativity  score. Second, bizarre, weird, and common 
responses that slip through the cracks of the  uniqueness index ought to be caught by the subjective raters. A 
common use for a brick like ―make a brick path,‖ for example, will always get low scores from raters. 
Moreover, several raters can evaluate the creativity of bizarre and weird responses, which is an improvement over 
the 0/1 decisions made by a single coder. And third, subjective ratings ought to be independent of 
sample size. Creativity is scored by the standards set by raters, not by the frequency of responses  in a pool. The 
raters’ standards ought to be the same regardless of the sample’s size, so the base rates of subjectively-scored 
creativity shouldn’t be artificially inflated or depressed for small and large samples. 
In the present research, we developed a system for subjective scoring of creativity. Raters received 
definitions of creativity proposed by Guilford, which they used as a guide for judging  the creativity of each 
response. We then evaluated two indexes of creativity derived from these subjective ratings. The first index, 
Average scoring, is a simple average of all of a person’s responses to a task. If someone generated 9 uses for 
brick, for example, the person’s creativity score is the average of the ratings of those 9 uses. The second index, 
inspired by a suggestion made by Michael and Wright (1989, p. 48), controls for the number of responses. 
After  generating their responses, people circle the two responses that they feel are the most creative.  The 
judges’ ratings of the top two responses are averaged to form each person’s creativity score for the task. This 
Top 2 index evaluates people’s best efforts, in their own judgment, and it thus represents people’s best level of 
performance when they are instructed to do their best. 
Our studies examine both scoring methods, but we expected Top 2 scoring to perform  better than 
Average scoring. First, by examining people’s best efforts, the Top 2 approach is a  form of maximal 
assessment: people are evaluated by the best level of performance they are able to achieve (Runco, 1986). 
Second, the Top 2 approach holds constant the number of responses  on which people are evaluated, which is a 
nice psychometric feature. Some people will give more responses than others, but each person is judged on his or 
her best two responses. And third, in real-world creativity, picking one’s best ideas is as important as 
generating a lot of ideas (Grohman et al., 2006; Kozbelt, 2007; Sawyer, 2006). The Top 2 index allows people to 
decide which of their responses are hits and which are misses. 
Many psychologists are skeptical of subjective scoring, particularly when an ostensibly objective method 
is available. Several researchers have contended that subjective ratings are simply too idiosyncratic to be 
useful: raters disagree too much with each other, and each person has his or her own vague definition of creativity 
(see discussions by Michael & Wright, 1989, and Runco & Mraz, 1992). In our view, subjective scoring should be 
considered seriously. First, the idiosyncrasies of raters have been overstated: many studies show excellent 
agreement in the subjective judgments of independent raters (Amabile, 1982; Baer et al., 2004; Kaufman et al., 
2005). Second, agreement between raters can be enhanced by giving them clear instructions, by providing 
accepted definitions of creativity, and by training them in the scoring system. Finding low agreement isn’t 
surprising when the raters aren’t trained or instructed (e.g., Runco & Mraz, 1992). Third, variance associated 
with raters needn’t be mere error—rater variance can be  modeled, thus reducing overall error. And fourth, the 
merit of a subjective scoring system is an empirical question. What’s important about scores is their reliability 
and validity, not their  ostensible level of objectivity or directness (Webb, Campbell, Schwartz, & Sechrest, 
1966). Whether subjective methods are better than objective methods is a matter for research, such as the 
present research. 
The Present Research 
The present research evaluated the reliability and validity of the two subjective scoring methods: Average 
scoring and Top 2 scoring. In Study 1, we conducted a generalizability analysis to estimate the variance in scores 
due to real differences between people and to differences between raters. Dependable scores would have most 
of the variance due to between-person differences in divergent thinking and much less variance due to the 
raters. For contrast, we compared the two subjective scoring methods with the Wallach and Kogan (1965) 
uniqueness index. In Study 2, we evaluated the validity of the scoring methods by conducting a large-sample latent-
variable analysis of personality and divergent thinking. If the scores are valid, then we  ought to be able to 
explain substantial variance in divergent thinking with theoretically  important predictors of creativity, such 
as dimensions of personality (e.g., Openness to  Experience) and lifestyle (e.g., choosing to pursue a college 
major related to the arts). 
Study 1: The Dependability of Average Scores and Top 2 Scores 
Generalizability theory (Cronbach et al., 1972; Shavelson & Webb, 1991) was chosen to examine the 
reliability of divergent thinking scores—or as generalizability theory (G-theory) puts it, the dependability of 
scores.2 Unlike classical test theory (CTT), G-theory takes in account more than one type of measurement error 
within the same analysis—error is considered  multifaceted. In CTT, for example, coefficient alpha estimates 
only how consistently items  measure a construct. Generalizability analysis can estimate how consistently items 
behave and raters behave, and it can take them both into account in the same coefficient. Generalizability 
analysis disentangles error by partitioning the variances that are accounted for by the object of measurement and 
by the defined facets of measurement error. Facets are major sources of  variation, and the conditions under 
random facets are considered interchangeable. For example,  if raters are a facet, then the researcher is willing 
to treat the raters as interchangeable. Facets  besides rater and task, for example, could also be time limit, rating 
scale, and testing condition. But it is the researcher’s task to determine, based on theoretical considerations and 
previous research findings, what types of measurement error are relevant for an instrument and its  
application. Equation 1 (Brennan, 2001) shows how variance components are decomposed in G- theory in a 
person-by-task-by-rater design. The observed score variance is partitioned into  person variance, task 
variance, rater variance, person-by-task variance, person-by-rater variance, task-by-rater variance, and the 
confounded variance of person-by-task-by-rater variance and  error. 
 
By partitioning error associated with measuring divergent thinking, researchers receive guidance on how 
to improve the precision of the scores. Based on estimated variances associated with conditions of measurement 
(e.g., raters), the dependability can be increased by adding  conditions to the facet that contributes most of the 
error. For example, if the analysis indicates that raters are a big source of inconsistency, then researchers can 
find out how many raters they need to get a desired dependability level or they could concentrate more efforts on 
rater training. This is conceptually similar to determining the increase in reliability in classical test theory by 
applying the Spearman-Brown formula for items. Generalizability analysis provides this  information because 
G-theory can partition error variance attributable to separate sources.  Based on this information, the analysis 
also offers estimates of dependability for modified measurement scenarios. For example, it estimates 
dependability for 2 raters and 4 tasks, 3 raters and 6 tasks, and any other possible combination. Researchers can 
then use these estimates when planning research. 
Generalizability analysis can provide estimates of the dependability of instruments  applied for norm-
reference measurement as well as criterion-reference measurement.  Specifically, if the goal is to compare 
examinees on their divergent thinking scores against each other—in other words, if we are interested in their 
relative standing to each other—then the generalizability coefficient (G-coefficient), analogous to coefficient alpha, 
would inform us how dependable a score is. On the other hand, if we are interested in the absolute standing of 
an examinee to a criterion, or how much the observed divergent thinking score deviates from the  true score, 
then we would want to know the phi-coefficient (phi coefficient) of a measure. The distinction between 
dependability for decisions on the relative standing of examinees and  decisions on the absolute standing of 
examinees can be made because G-theory provides  estimations for G-coefficients (for relative decisions) and 
phi coefficients (for absolute decisions).  G-coefficients are higher than ~ coefficients because they consider 
different error terms in  calculating the dependability. Because we are interested in the relative standing of 
examinees in relative decisions, the G-coefficient considers only error terms associated with interaction effects. 
On the other hand, when we are interested in absolute decisions, we must consider the main  error effects as 
well. The greater error term for the denominator of the formula shrinks the ~ coefficient. The generalizability 
and ~ coefficients will be identical if there is no error associated with the main error effects. 
Another differentiation that G-theory makes is between generalizability studies and  decision studies. 
Whereas the generalizability study (G-study) provides the variance components and dependability coefficients 
associated with the study’s measurement design, the decision  study (D-study) estimates the variance 
components and dependability coefficients for alternative study designs. For example, our original design 
includes three raters and three tasks, and the G- study informs about the variance decomposition and the 
dependability coefficients. The D-study then provides estimates for alternative designs with different 
combinations of raters and tasks: 2 raters and 3 tasks, 4 raters and 3 tasks, 3 raters and 5 tasks, and so forth. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
A total of 79 undergraduate students enrolled in General Psychology at the University of North Carolina 
at Greensboro (UNCG) participated as part of a research participation option.  Two people were excluded 
because of substantial missing data, yielding a final sample of 77 (48 women, 29 men). The sample had a wide 
range of majors: the most common majors were fine  arts and performing arts (12%), undeclared (9%), 
education (8%), and psychology (8%).  Divergent Thinking Tasks 
People arrived at the lab in groups of 3 to 8. After completing a consent form, they  learned that the 
study was about the psychology of creativity. From the beginning of the study,  the experimenter emphasized 
that the researchers were interested in how people think creatively; the description of the study included 
instructions intended to emphasize that people ought to try to be creative. For example, part of the description 
was: ―Our study today is about how people think creatively, like how people come up with original, innovative 
ideas. Everyone can think creatively, and we’d like to learn more about how people do it. So today people will 
work on a few different creativity tasks, which look at how people think creatively.‖ 
We think that it is essential to instruct people to try to be creative, for three reasons. First, instructing people 
to be creative increases the creativity of their responses (e.g., Christensen et 
al., 1957; Runco, Illies, & Eisenman, 2005), which will raise the ceiling of creativity in the sample and hopefully 
expand the variance in creativity scores. Second, instructing people to be creative makes the scores more valid 
indicators of individual differences. Harrington (1975) for example, showed that ―be creative‖ instructions 
enhanced the covariance between divergent thinking  scores and measures of personality (see also Katz & Poag, 
1979). And third, creativity scores are ambiguous when people are not trying to be creative. Someone can achieve 
a low score by having a genuinely low level of creativity or by failing to realize that the study is about creativity. 
We administered three divergent thinking tasks: an unusual uses task, an instances task,  and a 
consequences task. For the unusual uses task, we instructed people to generate creative uses for a brick. The 
experimenter’s instructions emphasized that the task was about creative uses: 
For this task, you should write down all of the original and creative uses for a brick that 
you can think of. Certainly there are common, unoriginal ways to use a brick; for this 
            task, write down all of the unusual, creative, and uncommon uses you can think of. You’ll 
have three minutes. Any questions? 
After three minutes, the experimenter instructed everyone to stop writing and to evaluate their responses. They 
were told to ―pick which two are your most creative ideas. Just circle the two that you think are your best.‖ 
People could take as much time as they wished to pick their top two, but they took only a few moments. 
For the instances task, we instructed people to generate creative instances of things that are round: 
For this task, you should write down all of the original and creative instances of things that are round 
that you can think of. Certainly there are some obvious things that are round; for this task, write 
down all of the unusual, creative, and uncommon instances of things that are round. You’ll have three 
minutes. Any questions? 
After the task, people circled their two most creative responses. 
For the consequences task, people had to generate creative consequences for a hypothetical scenario: what 
would happen if people no longer needed to sleep. As before, we instructed them  to generate creative 
consequences: 
For this task, imagine that people no longer needed to sleep. What would happen as a consequence? 
Write down all of the original, creative consequences of people no longer needing to sleep. You’ll have 
three minutes. Any questions? 
People circled their two most creative responses after the task. 
Scoring the Responses 
The participants in the study generated 1,596 responses. Each response was typed into a spreadsheet and 
then sorted alphabetically within each task. (Spelling errors were silently  corrected prior to rating.) This 
method ensured that the raters were blind to several factors that  could bias their ratings: (1) the person’s 
handwriting; (2) whether the person circled a response as a top 2 response; (3) the response’s serial position in 
the set; (4) the total number of responses  in the set; and (5) the preceding and following responses. Three raters 
evaluated each response to each task. The raters read all of the responses prior to scoring them, and they 
scored the  responses separately from the other raters. Each response received a rating on a 1 to 5 scale (1 = not 
at all creative, 5 = highly creative). 
The scoring criteria were adopted from Wilson, Guilford, and Christensen’s (1953) classic article on 
individual differences in originality. In their model, creative responses are uncommon, remote, and 
clever. In support of their model, they found that tasks designed to measure uncommonness, remoteness 
of association, and cleverness loaded on a single originality factor. The instructions given to the raters are 
shown in Appendix 1. The raters were told to consider all three dimensions when making their ratings, 
and they were told (following Guilford) that strength in one facet can balance weakness in another facet. 
Two specific additional criteria were used, following recommendations by Harrington et al. (1983). For 
the uses task, the raters were told to give lower scores to actual uses for bricks (e.g., making a wall or a 
fireplace); for the instances task, the raters were told to give lower scores to round objects visible in the 
research room (e.g., bottles of water, pens and pencils). 
Forming the Creativity Indexes 
We calculated three creativity indexes for analysis. 
Average creativity. The first and most straightforward index is the average rating of all of the responses. 
For this index, the person’s ratings were summed and then divided by the number of responses. This index takes 
into account the entire set of responses: someone with 3 creative responses will have a higher average than 
someone with 3 creative responses and 5 uncreative responses. The Average creativity index thus imposes a 
penalty for generating many uncreative responses. 
Top 2 creativity. The second index averaged the ratings of the responses that people chose as their two 
best responses. Unlike Average scoring, Top 2 scoring constrains the number of responses that are assessed 
and thus omits some responses. For this index, someone with 3 creative responses (2 picked as the top 2) will 
have similar scores as someone with 2 creative responses (both picked as the top 2) and 5 uncreative responses. 
Because it includes only the best 
scores, as decided by the respondent, the Top 2 index doesn’t penalize people for generating many uncreative 
responses. (If a person had only one response, the value for that response was used. If a person had no 
responses, the data were labeled as missing.) 
Uniqueness. The third index was the classic 0/1 uniqueness index developed by Wallach and Kogan 
(1965). People received a 1 for each response that was unique in the sample and a 0 for each response that 
was given by at least one other person. The unique responses were summed to create scores for each person. 
An Overview the Generalizability Analyses 
G-theory allows the researcher to define a universe of admissible observations by determining facets. 
Facets are measurement conditions that are seen as similar and interchangeable. For Average scoring and Top 
2 scoring, we included the object of measurement (the examinees, which are not considered a source of error) 
and two facets of measurement error: the rater facet and the task facet. G-theory can treat facets as random 
or fixed. In the current design, raters are considered random, tasks were treated as random initially (but the 
results suggested changing them to a fixed facet3), and scoring type was included as fixed (treating each 
scoring type separately). For uniqueness scoring, we included the object of measurement and one facet of 
measurement error: the task facet. 
The difference between random and fixed lies in the idea of interchanging measurement conditions. For 
example, raters are considered interchangeable, which means that the score evaluated by one rater should be 
consistent with a score given by another rater. In other words, theoretically there is an infinite pool of raters, and if 
we randomly draw a set of three raters, their scoring of a divergent thinking task should produce roughly the 
same observed score as another random set of three raters evaluating the same task by the same examinee. In the 
case of a fixed facet, here the scoring type, there is not an infinite universe of scoring types. Hence, we do not 
randomly sample scoring types or see them as interchangeable. These conceptualizations are similar to how 
factors would be defined in ANOVA. In terms of interpretation, the score on a divergent thinking task reached by 
one scoring type (e.g., Average scoring) does not provide information about the score from another scoring type 
(e.g., uniqueness). We consider scoring type as a fixed facet because, conceptually, we do not view the scoring 
methods as interchangeable. For the univariate analysis, GENOVA (Crick & Brennan, 1983) was used to obtain 
variance component estimates and generalizability and ~ coefficients. 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the creativity scores for each task. These scores are averaged 
across the 3 raters. 
Generalizability and Dependability 
Our generalizability analyses are broken into three steps. First, we present the results for the person-by-
rater design (p x r design) for Average scoring and Top 2 scoring. This design assumes that tasks are fixed 
effects, so each task is analyzed separately. Second, we present the results for the person-by-task design (p x t 
design) for uniqueness scoring. Sample sizes differed slightly due to missing data, given that GENOVA requires 
listwise deletion of missing data. Generalizability Study for p x r Design for Average Scoring and Top 2 Scoring 
For our primary analysis, we used a p x r design: task was estimated as a fixed facet. The results for 
Average scoring for each task are shown in Table 2. The unusual uses task and the 
instances task performed equally well, but the consequences task stuck out. The variances explained by real 
performance differences between examinees were high (62.6% for the unusual uses task and 63.9% for the 
instances task). The raters accounted for some of the variance (10.4% for the unusual uses task and 12.4% for the 
instances task). This result indicates that raters were slightly inconsistent in their ratings across examinees—
some raters are consistently more stringent than others—but the variance due to raters appears modest in light 
of the variance due to examinees. The confounded components of person-by rater interaction and random 
error were substantial (27% for the unusual uses task and 23.7% for the instances task). 
For the consequences task, we had less variance associated with people (34%) and much more variance 
introduced by raters (37.4%). This was a large variance component: the raters behaved inconsistently across 
people for this task. If more variance in scores is due to the raters than to the test takers, then the task is a poor 
measure of the test takers’ performance. As we’ll show later, researchers would need a lot of raters to obtain a 
dependable divergent thinking score on the consequences task. 
For Top 2 scoring (see Table 3), the pattern for all three tasks mirrored the pattern for Average scoring. 
Overall, this scoring approach was slightly less dependable. The variance associated with people was smaller 
than in Average scoring (56.2% for the unusual uses task and 50.0% for instances task), although it was at least 
half of the variance in each case. The random error with the person-by-rater interaction increased (40.6% for 
the unusual uses task and 41.4% for the instances task). The variance accounted for by rater inconsistencies was 
smaller (3.2% for the unusual uses task and 8.6% for the instances task), but that shouldn’t be considered an 
improvement in light of the other components in the model. The consequences task, as with 
Average scoring, performed the worst: the variances accounted for by people (34.9%), raters (28.3%), and 
error with person-by-rater interaction (36.8) were about equal. 
Dependability Coefficients for p x R Design for Average Scoring and Top 2 Scoring 
The decision study forecasts what dependability scores a researcher could expect under variations of the 
design. Table 4 shows G-coefficients (for relative decisions) and ~ coefficients (for absolute decisions). Like 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficients, they range from 0 to 1, and higher values reflect more dependable scores. As with 
alpha, .80 can serve as an informal threshold for reliable scores (DeVellis, 2003). By means of D-study analysis, we 
also can estimate dependability estimates associated with other measurement designs. Researchers planning 
divergent thinking research can use these estimates to choose which tasks to use and how many raters to train. 
These dependability estimates show several trends. First, Average scoring had higher coefficients than 
Top 2 scoring. Table 4 shows that, on the whole, Average scoring produced  more dependable scores for all 
three tasks and for all numbers of raters. Second, the unusual uses task and the instance task produced similarly 
dependable scores, but the consequences task  produced less dependable scores. Third, the effect of adding raters 
on dependability diminishes quickly. In general, increasing raters from 1 to 2 has a large effect on 
dependability, and  increasing raters from 2 to 3 has an appreciable effect. The gain from increasing raters to 4 
is small, and little is gained from going from 4 to 5 raters. Finally, as expected, the ~ coefficients were 
consistently lower than the G-coefficients. 
Uniqueness Scoring 
Uniqueness scoring has a task facet but no rater facet: a single person coded whether or not a response 
was unique within the pool of responses. As Table 5 shows, examinees accounted 
for 15.9% of the variance, tasks accounted for 28.5% of the variance, and the interaction of  person and task 
including the random error accounted for 55.6% of the variance. This result indicates that tasks differed in 
terms of difficulty. The interaction of person and task including  the random error explained the largest amount 
of variance. We only can speculate about the reasons because this variance component is confounded. This 
variance may be attributable to  people performing differently across tasks, to random error, or to both. 
Overall, users of this  scoring technique can’t expect dependable scores. The dependability coefficients for 
the uniqueness scoring in the 1-facet design (p x t) were poor (see Table 6). To get dependable  scores, 
researchers would need 15 tasks to get .81 for relative decisions and 20 tasks to get .79 for absolute decisions. 
Was Creativity Distinct From Fluency? 
The confounding of creativity scores and fluency scores has plagued divergent thinking research for 
several decades. Table 7 shows the relationships of the creativity scores with fluency (i.e., the number of 
responses generated on the task). The two subjective scoring methods  performed well, but the uniqueness 
scoring method showed the usual high correlations with  fluency. The Pearson correlations between creativity 
and fluency ranged from -.23 to -.05 for Average scoring, from -.18 to .09 for Top 2 scoring, and from .35 to 
.67 for uniqueness scoring. The Average and Top 2 indexes thus apparently avoid the fluency confound that 
pervades  research with the uniqueness index. For the Average and Top 2 scores, people with creative  scores 
were not necessarily people who generated a lot of responses. The small negative  coefficients, in fact, indicate 
that generating a lot of responses predicted somewhat less creative responses. 
We should point out that fluency scores have a different meaning in our study than in studies that did 
not instruct people to be creative (e.g., Wallach & Kogan, 1965). Telling people be creative causes fewer 
responses (Christensen et al., 1957; Harrington, 1975), probably because people use quality-over-quantity 
strategies instead of mere-quantity strategies. Thus, the scores represent the number of responses people 
generated while trying to generate creative responses, not the number of responses people could generate when 
trying to generate as many as possible. We suspect that both the average level of fluency and the variance in 
fluency is lower in our  study, which would deflate correlations between fluency and other variables. 
Discussion 
Study 1 explored the dependability of subjective ratings of divergent thinking tasks. Both the Average 
scoring and the Top 2 scoring performed well for most of the tasks. For the unusual uses and instances tasks, 
both scoring methods yielded dependable scores (G > .80) with two or three raters. For the consequences task, 
participants and raters contributed equal variance to the scores; this task would require four or five raters for 
dependable scores. We compared these 
scores to the Wallach and Kogan (1965) uniqueness scoring. According to our analyses,  uniqueness scoring 
requires many tasks (around 15) to reach a dependability of .80. Moreover, only the uniqueness scoring 
showed appreciable relationships with fluency—the subjective scoring methods yielded scores that were 
essentially unrelated to fluency. 
We should emphasize that our findings—both the variance decomposition and the coefficients of 
dependability—are based on a design with 73 examinees, 3 raters, and 3 tasks. As in classical test theory, the 
results are sample-dependent. Replications would provide  information on how much these estimates vary 
from sample to sample. If researchers have the resources, then it would be helpful to run a G-study and D-study 
during a piloting phase to get information on how many raters are needed to get dependable scores. By 
applying G-studies and D-studies, the precision of measurement can be greatly increased—researchers can 
understand and thus reduce the sources of error in their tools for measuring creativity. 
Study 2: Validity of Average and Top 2 Scoring 
Study 1 suggested that the scores from both subjective scoring methods had good  reliability. What 
about validity? Study 2 sought evidence to support our interpretation of the divergent thinking scores. To 
appraise validity, we examined the relationship between divergent thinking scores and broad dimensions of 
personality. Creativity research has a long tradition of research on relationships between divergent thinking and 
individual differences (for reviews, see Joy, 2004; Runco, 2007; Sawyer, 2006; Weisberg, 2006), so personality 
provides a meaningful context for appraising whether the divergent thinking scores behave as they should. 
The five-factor model of personality is a natural place to start when exploring personality and creativity. 
Five-factor theories propose that personality structure can be captured with five broad factors: neuroticism, 
extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness (McCrae & Costa, 1999). In 
creativity research, openness to experience is the most widely-studied of the five factors. If any personality trait is 
a ―general factor‖ in creativity, openness to experience would be it. First, openness is associated with divergent 
thinking. Past research with the Guilford tasks (McCrae, 1987) and the Torrance verbal tasks (Carson,  
Peterson, & Higgins, 2005; King, Walker, & Broyles, 1996) has found medium-sized effects between openness 
and divergent thinking (r = .30, Carson et al., 2005; r = .34, McCrae, 1987; r = .38, King et al., 1996). Second, 
openness is associated with other aspects of a creative personality, 
such as viewing oneself as a creative person and valuing originality (Joy, 2004; Kaufman & Baer, 2004). Finally, 
openness is associated with creative accomplishment in diverse domains, such as science and the arts (Feist, 1998, 
2006). 
The five factors form two higher-order factors (DeYoung, 2006; Digman, 1997). Plasticity—composed 
of openness to experience and extraversion—reflects a tendency toward variable, flexible behavior. It captures 
the novelty-seeking and unconventional qualities of  openness and the impulsive and energetic qualities of 
extraversion. Stability—composed of neuroticism (reversed), agreeableness, and conscientiousness—reflects 
a tendency toward  controlled, organized, regulated behavior. It captures the stable moods and self-perceptions 
of emotional stability (the other pole of neuroticism); the empathetic, friendly, and accommodating qualities of 
agreeableness; and the self-control of conscientiousness. Plasticity and stability resemble other well-known 
dichotomies in personality psychology (Digman, 1997), such impulsiveness versus constraint (Carver, 2005) and 
ego-resiliency versus ego-control (Letzring, Block, & Funder, 2005). Research has not yet examined relations 
between creativity and the  higher-order factors, which for convenience we’ll call the Huge 2. 
We assessed commitment to a college major in the arts as a predictor of divergent  thinking. Our 
sample, which is primarily first-year college students, is too young to examine the relationship between creative 
accomplishments across the lifespan and divergent thinking (cf. Plucker, 1999). But we can measure whether 
people have committed to an artistic occupation, thus capturing indirectly people’s creative interests (Feinstein, 
2006) and providing concurrent evidence for validity. People pursuing arts majors—majors devoted to the fine 
arts, performing arts, or decorative arts—have chosen to devote their college years to receiving training in an 
artistic field, and training is necessary for later creative accomplishment (Sawyer, 2006). Variability in college 
majors can thus represent the creativity of people’s occupational and lifespan goals. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
A total of 242 students enrolled in General Psychology at UNCG participated in the ―Creativity and 
Cognition‖ project and received credit toward a research option. We excluded 16 (6.6%) people who showed 
limited English proficiency, who had extensive missing data, or who gave capricious responses to the 
questionnaire (e.g., circling the midpoint for most items). This  left us with a final sample of 226 people (178 
women, 48 men). According to self-reported ethnic identification, the sample was 63% European American, 27% 
African American, and 10% other ethnic groups. Most people (82%) were 18 or 19 years old. The most 
common college majors  were nursing (31%), undecided (11%), and biology (5%); fewer than 3% were 
psychology majors. 
Procedure 
People participated in 90-minute sessions in groups of 1 to 13. After providing informed consent, people 
learned that the study was about the psychology of creativity. The experimenter explained that the researchers 
were interested in how creativity related to various aspects of personality, attitudes, and thinking styles. People 
completed several creativity tasks, cognitive tasks, and measures of personality; we present the findings for 
personality and the unusual-uses tasks here. 
Divergent Thinking Tasks 
The experiment began with the divergent thinking tasks. Study 1 found that the unusual- uses task had 
the highest reliability, so in Study 2 we measured individual differences in divergent thinking with two unusual uses 
tasks: uses for a brick and uses for a knife. We used the same instructions and procedure as in Study 1: we 
instructed people to be creative, people had three minutes per task, and they circled their top two responses after 
each task. 
Big 5 Scales 
We measured the Big 5 domains of personality with three scales. For the first scale, we  used Costa and 
McCrae’s (1992) 60-item Five Factor Inventory, which measures each domain  with 12 items. People 
responded to complete sentences (e.g., the Openness item ―Sometimes  when I am reading poetry or looking at 
a work of art, I feel a chill or wave of excitement‖) on a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). 
For the second scale, we formed a 50-item Big 5 scale from the Big 5 items in Goldberg’s public-domain 
International Personality Item Pool (IPIP; Goldberg et al., 2006). Each domain was measured by 10 items. 
People rated how well sentence fragments described them (e.g., the Openness item ―Am full of ideas‖) on a 5-
point scale (1 = very inaccurate description of me, 5 = very accurate description of me). For the third scale, we used 
Gosling, Rentfrow, and Swann’s (2003) 10-item brief Big 5 scale, which measures each domain with two items. 
Each item has two adjectives, and people rated how well the adjective  pair described them (e.g., the Openness 
item ―Open to new experiences, complex‖) on a 5-point scale (1 = very inaccurate description of me, 5 = very 
accurate description of me). 
Arts Major 
On a demographic page, people listed their major in college. We classified each person’s college major as 
either an arts major (1 point) or a conventional major (0 points). All majors, concentrations, and certification 
programs (called simply ―majors‖) concerned with the fine arts, performing arts, and decorative arts were 
classified as arts majors. When necessary, we consulted UNCG’s Undergraduate Bulletin and faculty who 
taught in the department for more  information about the major. Twenty-one people (9%) had arts majors; 205 
people (91%) had conventional majors. The arts majors were acting, apparel products design, art education, 
art history, dance, graphic design, interior architecture, music, music education, vocal performance,  fine art, 
studio art, theatre, and theatre education. 
Results 
Scoring the Divergent Thinking Tasks 
People generated 3,224 responses: 1,641 for the brick task, and 1,583 for the knife task. People’s Top 2 
responses made up 27.5% of the brick responses (452 responses) and 28.5% of the knife responses (451 
responses; one participant generated only one knife response). Three raters evaluated each response following 
the same instructions and methods as in Study 1. Table 8 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables. 
There were no missing observations. 
To simplify the reporting of a large number of effects—and to recognize that small effects will be 
significant with a large sample—we describe our findings in terms of small (around ß = .10), medium (around ß 
= .30), and large (around ß = .50) effect sizes. A Web appendix,  available on the first author’s Internet page, 
provides the details (e.g., the standardized effects, unstandardized effects, intercepts, variances, standard errors, 
and residual variances) for each component of the 12 latent variable models reported here. For clarity, 
Figures 1–4 depict  simplified models that omit indicators, factor covariances, and residual variances. 
Model Specification and Model Fit 
We estimated the latent variable models with Mplus 4.21. (The estimates were essentially identical when 
estimated with AMOS 6.0.) Our first step involved estimating measurement  models for divergent thinking, for 
the Big 5 factors, and for the Huge 2 factors. To assess model fit, we considered the root mean-square error of 
approximation (RMSEA), the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), the comparative fit index (CFI), 
the chi-square divided by the degrees of freedom (Q2/df), and the chi-square test (Q2). The RMSEA accounts for a 
model’s complexity: values less than .10 indicate moderate fit, and values less than .05 indicate close fit (Browne 
& Cudeck, 1993). The SRMR indicates the average absolute difference between the  sample correlation matrix 
and the correlation matrix implied by the model. Values less than .10 are good (Kline, 2005). The 
comparative fit index (CFI) indicates how well the fit of the  predicted model improves upon the fit of a null 
model. CFI values greater than .95 are seen as  good (Hu & Bentler, 1999). Ratios of Q2/df less than 2 indicate 
good fit (Byrne, 1989, p. 55). 
We modeled Divergent Thinking as a higher-order latent variable composed of two latent variables: a Brick 
variable and a Knife variable. The paths from the higher-order variable to the Brick and Knife variables were 
constrained to be equal for identification; the variance of  Divergent Thinking was set to 1. The three raters’ 
scores were the observed indicators for the  Brick and Knife variables. Because the paths for the first and third 
raters were nearly identical for the Top 2 model, we constrained them to be equal for the Top 2 model (but not 
the Average model). For both models, we set the paths for the second rater to 1. The fit of this model was  good 
for the Top 2 scores (RMSEA = .044, SRMR = .048, CFI = .99, Q2/df = 1.43, Q2(10) = 14.32, p < .16) and for the 
Average scores (RMSEA = .04, SRMR = .026, CFI = .99, Q2/df = 1.36, Q2(8) = 10.88, p < .21). 
We modeled the Big 5 factors as five latent variables, each indicated by three scales. For each factor, we 
set the path to the IPIP scale to 1. The fit of the Big 5 model was not as good as  the fit of the Divergent 
Thinking model (RMSEA = .106, SRMR = .087, CFI = .88, Q2/df = 3.54, Q2(80) = 283.17, p < .001). For the 
Huge 2 factors, the higher-order Plasticity variable was 
composed of the latent Openness and Extraversion variables; Plasticity’s paths to these variables were 
constrained to be equal for identification. The higher-order Stability variable was composed of the latent 
Neuroticism, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness variables. The variances of  Plasticity and Stability were set 
to 1. The fit of this model was about the same as the Big 5 model (RMSEA = .102, SRMR = .086, CFI = .88, Q2/df = 
3.36, Q2(85) = 285.73, p < .001). Neither of the personality models had strong fit, but the models were retained 
because they represent theories  of personality structure (McCrae & Costa, 1999). Because the divergent thinking 
model fit well, misfit in the full structural models is likely due to the personality factors, not the divergent  
thinking factor. 
Big 5 and Divergent Thinking 
We first examined how the Big 5 factors predicted divergent thinking. Figure 1  (simplified for clarity) 
presents the standardized path estimates. For Top 2 scores, the five factors explained 49.4% of the variance (RMSEA 
= .073, SRMR = .073, CFI = .89, Q2/df = 2.21, Q2(175) = 386.65, p < .001). Openness (ß = .586) and 
Conscientiousness (ß = -.464) had large effect sizes; Agreeableness had a smaller effect size, and Extraversion 
and Neuroticism explained little  variance. For Average scores, the five factors explained 17.2% of the variance 
(RMSEA = .072, SRMR = .072, CFI = .91, Q2/df = 2.19, Q2(173) = 378.47, p < .001). Openness (ß = .306) and 
Conscientiousness (ß = -.297) had medium effect sizes; Agreeableness, Extraversion, 
Neuroticism explained little variance. In short, the Top 2 scores appeared to have much better validity, as 
indexed by variance explained and by the effect sizes. 
Our second set of models entered arts major as an additional predictor; Figure 2 depicts  the standardized 
path estimates. For Top 2 scores, entering arts major increased the variance explained to 57.6% (RMSEA = .069, 
SRMR = .07, CFI = .90, Q2/df = 2.08, Q2(190) = 396.00, p < .001). Arts major had a moderate effect size (ß = .339). 
For Average scores, entering arts major increased the variance explained to 21.8% (RMSEA = .069, SRMR = .069, 
CFI = .91, Q2/df = 2.07, Q2(188) = 388.79, p < .001). Arts major had a smaller effect (ß = .236). As before, the 
Top 2 scores performed better than the Average scores: the model for Top 2 scores explained over half  of the 
variance in divergent thinking. 
Huge 2 and Divergent Thinking 
What about the higher-order factors of the Big 5? Our next set of models examined how the Huge 2—Plasticity 
and Stability—predicted Top 2 and Average scores. As before, we first examined personality alone and then 
entered creative major. Figure 3 presents the standardized path estimates. For Top 2 scores, Plasticity and 
Stability explained 42.1% of the variance  (RMSEA = .073, SRMR = .077, CFI = .89, Q2/df = 2.19, Q2(183) = 
401.47, p < .001). Plasticity had a large effect (ß = .642), and Stability had a medium effect in the other direction (ß 
= -.322). For Average scores, Plasticity and Stability explained 17% of the variance (RMSEA = .072, SRMR = 
.076, CFI = .91, Q2/df = 2.16, Q2(181) = 390.56, p < .001). Both Plasticity (ß = .388) and Stability (ß = -.247) had 
medium effect sizes. As before, the Top 2 scores performed better than the  Average scores. 
Our next analyses entered arts major as a predictor. Figure 4 presents the standardized path estimates. 
For Top 2 scores, entering arts major increased the variance explained to 54/0 (RMSEA = .069, SRMR = .076, 
CFI = .89, Q2/df = 2.06, Q2(201) = 414.46, p < .001). Arts major had a medium effect (ß = .337). For Average 
scores, entering arts major increased the variance explained to 22/0 (RMSEA = .068, SRMR = .075, CFI = .91, 
Q2/df = 2.04, Q2(199) = 405.93, p < .001). Arts major had a smaller effect (ß = .210). As before, personality and 
creative major collectively explained over half of the variance in Top 2 scores. 
Did Fluency Confound Top 2 Scores? 
Did Top 2 scores perform well by virtue of an association with fluency scores? We have argued that 
subjective scoring avoids the confounding of creativity with fluency, and Study 1  found small relationships 
between the ratings and fluency scores. The same small effects  appeared here. We estimated all four Top 2 
models and included a latent fluency variable.  Fluency was composed of the standardized fluency scores for the 
Brick and Knife tasks; the paths were constrained to be equal, and the variance of fluency was set to 1. In all four 
models, fluency had small effects on divergent thinking: ß = .122 for the Big 5 model, ß = .103 for the Big 5 & 
Arts Major model, ß = .06 for the Huge 2 model, and ß = .055 for the Huge 2 & Arts Major  model. It’s clear, 
then, that fluency contributed little variance to the Top 2 scores. 
Discussion 
Study 2 found evidence for the validity of our subjective scoring methods. Both Top 2 scoring and 
Average scoring performed well, but Top 2 scoring was the clear winner. Table 9  depicts the percentage of 
variance explained by the latent variable models. In each case, at least twice as much variance was explained in 
Top 2 scores than in Average scores. For all of the  models, Top 2 scores and Average scores showed the same 
patterns, but the effect sizes for Top 2 scores were consistently larger. Several large effects (i.e., ß > .50) were 
found for Top 2 scores, but no large effects were found for Average scores. And these effects were independent of 
fluency scores, which contributed little to the prediction of divergent thinking. It’s worth pointing out  that we 
used only two tasks and three raters—it wasn’t necessary to pool information from a lot tasks and raters to find 
these effects. Furthermore, the personality scores and the divergent  thinking scores came from different 
methods: self-reports for personality, raters’ judgments of performance on timed tasks for divergent thinking. 
Taken together, the concurrent evidence for validity is compelling enough to motivate future research. 
We used personality as a context for examining validity, but the personality findings are interesting in their 
own right. For Top 2 scores, we found large effects of Openness to Experience on divergent thinking, and, 
intriguingly, Conscientiousness. High Openness predicted high  creativity, but high Conscientiousness predicted 
low creativity. Although Openness gets the most attention, research has found strong but complex relationships 
between creativity and Conscientiousness. In Feist’s (1998) meta-analysis, scientists were more conscientious than 
nonscientists, but artists were less conscientious than non-artists. Our sample of young adults can’t address the 
role of conscientiousness in domain-specific accomplishment; this issue deserves  more attention in future 
work. 
The relations of Openness and Conscientiousness were mirrored among the Huge 2  factors. Plasticity 
and Stability predicted divergent thinking in opposing directions: Plasticity had a large positive effect, and 
stability had a medium negative effect. Plasticity’s effect was larger than the effects of Openness and 
Extraversion, its lower-order variables. Perhaps what Openness and Extraversion share—a tendency toward 
approach-oriented action—is more important than their individual features. The psychology of creativity’s focus 
on Openness may be overlooking a much stronger higher-order relationship. Finally, it is interesting that 
pursuing a college major in the arts consistently had a medium effect on divergent thinking. Future research is 
needed to unravel the intriguing meanings of this relationship, which could reflect an effect of training on 
divergent thinking, an effect of divergent thinking on what people choose to pursue, or a  common third 
factor. 
General Discussion 
Despite its venerable history, divergent thinking has a bad reputation in sociocultural  theories and 
cognitive theories of creativity (Sawyer, 2006; Weisberg, 2006). When faced with a body of modest effects, 
researchers should examine the quality of their measurement tools. With instruments that yield unreliable scores, 
researchers are unlikely to find large effect sizes and consistent relationships. Our two studies explored the 
value of two subjective-scoring methods. These studies generated a lot of information: we unpack our findings 
below. 
Reliability 
Numbers of Raters and Tasks 
The reliability of divergent thinking scores is due in part to the number of tasks that  people complete. 
Thus far, there is no empirical guidance for how many tasks is sufficient or appropriate. A glance at research 
shows incredible variance: studies have administered 1 task  (Silvia & Phillips, 2004), 3 tasks (Hocevar, 1979a), 
4 tasks (Carson et al., 2005), 9 tasks (Katz & Poag, 1979), and 15 tasks (Runco, 1986). Wallach and Kogan 
(1965), in their classic research, set the record—they administered 39 divergent thinking tasks. One task is 
probably not enough for dependable scores; 39 is probably excessive. It’s hard to tell, based on intuition, how 
many tasks ought to be used. And when using subjective ratings, researchers are faced with deciding how many 
raters are necessary to obtain reliable scores. To date, research on divergent thinking has used a wide range of 
raters, such as 1 rater (Wilson et al., 1953), 2 raters (Christensen et al., 1957; Silvia & Phillips, 2004), 3 raters 
(Grohman et al., 2006; Harrington, 1975; Mouchiroud & Lubart, 2001), and 4 raters (Hocevar, 1979b). Research 
using the consensual assessment technique has a wide range as well, such as 5 raters (Carson et al., 2005), 13 
raters (Kaufman et al., 2005), and 20 raters (Amabile, 1982). One rater is clearly not enough; 20 seems like 
overkill. 
Generalizability theory can provide practical guidelines for research by estimating how tasks and raters 
contribute to reliability. In Study 1, we used three tasks—an unusual uses task, and instances task, and a 
consequences task—that are typical of the kinds of verbal tasks used in divergent thinking research (Runco, 2007) 
and in creativity testing (Torrance, 2008). We found that the unusual uses task and the instances task functioned 
similarly, but the consequences task deviated from both. Under Average scoring, to get a dependable divergent 
thinking score of above .80 for relative decisions, we would need two raters for the unusual uses task (.82), two 
raters for the instances task (.84), but three raters for the consequences task (.83). The Top 2  scoring functioned 
less well overall, but the pattern for the three tasks was similar. Under Top 2 scoring, to reach a dependability of 
above .80, we would need three raters for the unusual uses task (.81), four raters for the instances task (.83), but 
five raters for the consequences task (.83). 
It’s noteworthy, we think, that consequences tasks have performed badly in other studies. In 
Harrington’s (1975) experiment, consequences tasks were administered but not analyzed  because the raters 
were unable to achieve reliable scores (Harrington, 1975, p. 440). In our own study, the participants and the 
raters accounted for similar amounts of variance on the consequences task. Researchers can enhance the 
dependability of a consequences task by adding more raters, but they might prefer to use other, more efficient 
tasks instead. 
Which Scoring Methods Performed Best? 
We have proposed that creativity researchers should use subjective scoring of divergent thinking tasks. 
Study 1 compared the reliability of three scoring methods: Average scoring, Top 2 scoring, and Wallach and 
Kogan’s (1965) uniqueness scoring. To start with the weakest method, we found that the uniqueness index 
functioned badly. For a dependability level of .80,  researchers would need 15 tasks (see Table 6). With 
fewer tasks, the uniqueness index will  provide undependable scores. For example, imagine a study that 
administers 4 tasks —a typical amount for divergent thinking research—and uses uniqueness scoring. According 
to Table 6, the scores would have a dependability level of .53. This value is bad: it wouldn’t be acceptable for a 
measure of attitudes, personality, or individual differences (DeVellis, 2003). In light of the poor dependability of 
the uniqueness index, it isn’t surprising that divergent thinking research rarely finds large effects. 
The two scoring methods based on subjective ratings, in contrast, performed well. Both Average scoring 
and Top 2 scoring produced dependable scores; researchers can expect dependability levels of .80 with 2 or 3 
raters (Table 4). Researchers should keep in mind that these dependability estimates are for studies that use our 
administration and scoring guidelines, which we have described in detail in the text and in Appendix 1. 
Were Subjective Ratings Eccentric and Idiosyncratic? 
Many researchers are skeptical of subjective ratings, believing them to be eccentric and idiosyncratic. But 
whether raters agree is an empirical matter, and we can easily evaluate how consistently raters judged the 
divergent thinking tasks. Overall, Study 1 found good levels of agreement among the raters for the unusual 
uses and instances tasks. For Average scoring, raters accounted for around 10–12% of the total variance; for 
Top 2 scoring, raters accounted for 4–8% of the total variance. And in each case, the variance due to 
performance differences between the participants was many times greater than the variance due to the raters. 
The pattern of variance—participants accounted for 50–60% of the variance and raters accounted for 4–12% 
of the variance—should allay concerns about whether these tasks are merely capturing willy-nilly differences 
between raters. 
Another way to understand the good level of agreement between raters is to examine how many raters are 
needed to have dependable scores. The dependability estimates (see Table 4) indicate that the gain in 
dependability diminishes after 3 or 4 raters. All of the G and ~ coefficients are over .80 for 4 raters, so 
researchers would rarely need to recruit and train more  than 4 raters. These values are practical for people 
working in the trenches of creativity research. 
Validity 
Predicting Divergent Thinking Scores 
According to most theories of validity, evidence for validity comes from establishing relationships 
between the construct of interest and other constructs (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Messick, 1995). Validity is 
never established definitively, but our first study of validity offered support for our assessment method. The Big 
Five factors and the creativity of people’s college majors collectively explained 57% of the variance in the Top 2 
scores of two unusual uses tasks (see Table 9). The other Top 2 models fared well, too, explaining at least 42% of 
the variance. Concurrent evidence for validity came from relationships with openness to experience, 
conscientiousness, and the creativity of people’s college majors. To expand the evidence for validity, future 
research should explore other constructs—such as individual differences in cognition, attitudes, and creative 
accomplishment—and other research designs, such as longitudinal designs. 
It’s interesting, we think, that the Top 2 scores had stronger evidence for validity than the Average scores. 
People’s best responses, as defined by the two they chose as their most creative, carry more information than all 
of their responses. This shouldn’t be too surprising: most  participants give at least a few uncreative responses, 
so the uncreative responses are more or less constant across people. The responses that discriminate between 
people are the best responses. Because the Top 2 scoring method evaluated only the best two responses, it omits 
responses that are less informative. 
Was Creativity Confounded With Fluency? 
Uniqueness scoring confounds the number of responses with the quality of responses (Hocevar, 1979a, 
1979b). In Study 1, we found the usual high positive correlations between  fluency scores and uniqueness 
scores. But fluency was essentially unrelated to the Average scores and Top 2 scores. A few of the correlations 
were modestly negative, indicating that people with creative responses tended to produce fewer responses overall. 
In Study 2, a latent fluency variable was essentially unrelated (a range of ß = .122 to ß = .055) to latent Top 2 scores. 
Past research has suggested many ways of handling the fluency confound, but these methods have generally not 
performed well psychometrically (see Michael & Wright, 1989). The subjective scoring methods, in contrast, 
sharply separate creativity from fluency and produce dependable, valid scores. 
Summary of Recommendations for Researchers 
Researchers can use Tables 4 and 6 to estimate the dependability of their measurement when designing 
experiments. Based on our two studies and other findings, we offer these take- home recommendations for 
researchers interested in using our approach to assessment and scoring: 
1. Researchers should instruct participants to be creative. Several studies have shown that ―creativity 
instructions‖ enhance the validity of divergent thinking scores (Harrington, 1975). 
2. The traditional Wallach and Kogan (1965) uniqueness index fared badly: it will give dependable scores 
only with many tasks. To achieve a dependability level of around .80, researchers will need 15 tasks 
(see Table 6). 
3. The unusual uses and instances tasks performed better than the consequences task in Study 1, and two 
unusual uses tasks performed well in Study 2. Unless researchers are specifically interested in consequences 
tasks, they probably ought to pick other classes of divergent thinking tasks. 
4. Concerning reliability, both Average scoring and Top 2 scoring worked well; Average scoring was slightly more 
dependable. To achieve a dependability level of around .80 for these scoring methods, researchers will need 2 
raters for Average scoring and 3 raters for Top 2 scoring (see Table 6). Researchers will rarely need more than 4 
raters. We recommend that researchers collect and analyze both kinds of scores. Top 2 scores are a subset of 
Average scores, so they require little extra effort. 
5. Concerning validity, Top 2 scores were the clear winner. Top 2 scores had consistently larger effects than 
Average scores, and the models explained at least twice as much variance in Top 2 scores than in Average 
scores. Judging people on their best responses appears to be an effective way of assessing individual differences 
in divergent thinking. 
Conclusion and Invitation 
The psychology of creativity ought to be open to innovative approaches to assessment.  We can 
guarantee that our Top 2 scoring method is not the best of all possible methods, but our research has shown that it 
performs well: the evidence for reliability is good, and we explained a huge amount of variance in divergent 
thinking. We encourage researchers to continue to develop new and refined approaches to assessment. To 
accelerate the development of better methods, we have archived the data from Studies 1 and 2. We invite 
researchers to use these data as  benchmarks for comparing new approaches. Researchers can apply new scoring 
methods to the responses and then directly compare which method performs better. Is our method better than  
the typical Torrance scores of fluency, originality, and flexibility (Torrance, 2008)? Is a single snapshot score—
one rating given to the entire set of responses (Mouchiroud & Lubart,  2001)—better than ratings of each 
response? Is it better to use the participant’s chosen top two responses, or are the two responses that received the 
highest ratings better? Do the Big 5 factors explain more variance in a new scoring method than in our Top 2 
method? Reliability and  validity are empirical questions; we’re curious to see the answers. 
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Footnotes 
1. Many of the variations of uniqueness scoring cannot overcome this problem. For  example, 
weighting each response by its frequency of occurrence (e.g., Wilson et al., 1953; Runco et al., 1987) doesn’t 
circumvent that large-sample penalty. The base rate of uniqueness still  declines with a large sample, thereby 
raising the criterion needed to receive a high weight.  Likewise, the probability of a response within a high 
percentile (e.g., 95th percentile; Milgram & Milgram, 1976) declines as the sample size increases. For example, a 
response has a higher chance of falling above the 95th percentile in a sample of 50 responses than in a sample 
of 1000  responses. By giving points for not-common responses, the TTCT avoids the base-rate problem. The 
confounding of fluency and originality, however, is still severe for the verbal TTCT  (Torrance, 2008). 
2. Cronbach et al. (1972, p. 15) described it best: 
The score on which the decision is to be based is only one of many scores that might serve the same purpose. The 
decision maker is almost never interested in the response given to the particular stimulus objects or questions, 
to the particular tester, at the particular moment of testing. Some, at least, of these conditions of measurement 
could be altered without making the score any less acceptable to the decision maker. That is to say, there is a 
universe of observations, any of which would have yielded a usable basis for the decision. The ideal datum 
on which to base the decision would be something like the  person’s mean score over all acceptable 
observations, which we shall call his ―universe score.‖ The investigator uses the observed score or some 
function of it as if it were the universe score. That is, he generalizes from sample to universe. The question of 
“reliability” thus resolves into a question of accuracy of generalization, or “generalizability.” 
3.          Our initial analyses treated tasks as a random facet, but the patterns of variance  suggested that tasks 
ought to be treated as fixed. Because we do not have enough tasks for a convincing test of whether the tasks are 
fixed versus random, we present only the fixed-facet analyses here. Readers interested in the full analyses can 
download them from the first author’s Web page. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Predicting divergent thinking from the Big 5 factors. 
 
Figure 2. Predicting divergent thinking from the Big 5 factors and arts major. 
 
Figure 3. Predicting divergent thinking from the Huge 2 factors. 
 
 
Figure 4. Predicting divergent thinking from the Huge 2 factors and arts major. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1: Instructions for Judging Creativity 
Creativity can be viewed as having three facets. Creative responses will generally be high on all three, although 
being low on one of them does not disqualify a response from getting a high rating. We will use a 1 to 5 scale: 
 
1. Uncommon 
Creative ideas are uncommon: they will occur infrequently in our sample. Any response  that is given by a 
lot of people is common, by definition. Unique responses will tend to be creative responses, although a 
response given only once needn’t be judged as creative. For example, a random or inappropriate response 
would be uncommon but not creative. 
2. Remote 
Creative ideas are remotely linked to everyday objects and ideas. For example, creative  uses for a brick 
are ―far from‖ common, everyday, normal uses for a brick, and creative instances of things that are round 
are ―far from‖ common round objects. Responses that stray from obvious ideas will tend to be creative, 
whereas responses close to obvious ideas will tend to be uncreative. 
3. Clever 
Creative ideas are often clever: they strike people as insightful, ironic, humorous, fitting, or smart. 
Responses that are clever will tend to be creative responses. Keep in mind that cleverness can compensate 
for the other facets. For example, a common use cleverly expressed could receive a high score. 
